In a prior post I excerpted portions of a CNBC interview with Warren Buffett in which he provided strong support for Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s plan to buy distressed securities from Wall Street firms.

On October 1, 2008, Warren Buffett was interviewed by Charlie Rose. The central points Mr. Buffett made were:

The economy, not just Wall Street, is at severe risk: “The patient that’s on the floor with the cardiac arrest is not Wall Street. It’s the American economy.”

There is a profound lack of confidence that has caused the credit markets to seize up: “You don’t want 300 million Americans putting their money under the mattress. This economy doesn’t work well without the lubrication of credit and trust. And that’s been lost. It’s a huge problem. What you have is you have the major institutions of the world all wanting to deleverage. They want to take down their assets and liabilities. What seemed so easy to borrow against a year ago now looks like rat poison to them. … it’s the deleveraging that’s going on right now that has caused the credit crisis.”

Deleveraging is necessary because everyone got fooled by the real estate bubble: “… the biggest single cause was we had an incredible residential real estate bubble. … 300 million Americans, their lending institutions, their government, their media, all believed that house prices were going to go up consistently. And that got billed into a $20 trillion residential home market. Lending was done based on it, and everybody did a lot of foolish things. And people really behaved in a fraudulent way or something, we’ll go back and find the culprits later on. But that really isn’t the problem we have. I mean that’s where it came from, though. We leveraged up and if you have a 20 percent fall in value of a $20 trillion asset, that’s $4 trillion. And when $4 trillion lands — losses land in the wrong part of this economy, it can gum up the whole place.”

People should have known better but in some way’s it’s unavoidable with markets: “People should always know better. … I mean people — people don’t get — they don’t get smarter about things that get as basic as greed and you can’t stand to see your neighbor getting rich. You know you’re smarter than he is, and he’s doing these things, you know, and he’s getting rich, and your spouse is getting unhappy with you because you aren’t doing — pretty soon you start doing it. And so you get what I call the natural progression, the three I’s: the innovators, the imitators, and the idiots. And that’s what happens. Everybody just kind of goes along. And you look kind of silly if you disagree.”

When all the private institutions need to delever, at the same time, the government is the only institution that can act: “There is only one institution in the world that can leverage up in a way that’s all a countervailing force to that, and that’s the United States Treasury.”

Time is of the essence: “I mean, if Pearl Harbor came along, you could have said the planning was wrong by the military ahead of time or maybe the battleships shouldn’t have all been in the harbor and all that kind of thing. … I mean, the job is Pearl Harbor. And you better not spends weeks and weeks and weeks trying to assign blame or deciding on a complete plan for fighting the whole war, you know, and letting a committee decide where the battleships should go and all of that. You better spring into action with the best people you have. … it’s very important that the determination of the US Congress to do what is is needed be made evident this week and by the actions of most of the members.”

The Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the FDIC have been fantastic:
“I don’t think you can have a better secretary of the Treasury than Hank Paulson … he knows markets, he knows corporations’ work, he knows money, and he’s got the interests of the country at heart. And so, you’ve got the right — you’ve got a wonderful person with Sheila Bair, most of the viewers have never heard of Sheila Bair. Sheila Bair, in the last two weeks, has taken eight percent of the deposits in the United States and seamlessly moved those over to sound institutions which in turn have gotten more capital, ended up, it’s been a magnificent job.”

Maybe we should see the Treasury Secretaries of Obama and McCain debate: “I would say it’s more important who the treasury secretary is than who the vice president is. If you want to have a debate here, I’d like a debate between potential treasury secretaries than the vice presidential debate.”

These government officials should be given tremendous resources and flexibility in how they implement the fix, but there should be oversight to make sure purchasing distressed securities is done at market prices: “Well, they need plenty of money and they really need plenty of flexibility to carry out this plan. They also need in my view to very much tie it to market prices. … I would hand something pretty close to a blank check to a fellow like Hank Paulson … trying to invest through 535 people is a tough job … I think the oversight is great, and I think that oversight ought to be devoted almost entirely to the question is this being done at market you know. … I think you’ll have plenty of scrutiny as how the money’s invested.”

$700 billion worth of purchases may be enough, if used to purchase distressed securities at market prices:
“700 billion is a lot of money. And it will buy a lot of distressed property. And if you buy them at the right price, you may be buying two trillion of face value. The one thing you don’t want to do — [unintelligible] paid for it what you’re paying it from or what his carrying value is, you got to buy it at market. And one way to do that is if some institution wants to sell you a billion dollars worth of mortgages, they might have to sell 100 million in the market, and then you’ll buy the other 900 million on the same terms.”

The US government can borrow money very cheaply, and buy mortgages at fear driven low prices, which should allow it to make a profit from the rescue, if it buys at the market price: “The U.S. Treasury has got borrowing costs like nobody else has. They can borrow basically unlimited amounts. They can stay there for years and years. These assets will be worth more money over time. So when Merrill Lynch sells a bunch of mortgage-related assets at 22 cents on the dollar like they did a month or so ago, the buyer goes — is going to make money, and he’s going to make a lot more money if it happens to be an institution like the U.S. government which has very, very cheap borrowing costs. … When the Federal government buys the mortgages, they’re not spending it, they’re investing it. Now, they’re investing it in distress type assets but they’re buying them at distress prices if they buy them at market. It’s the kind of stuff I love to do. I just don’t have 700 million. Maybe we could go in it together. … But like I say, we are not spending money. I mean, if we buy these assets intelligently, the United States Treasury will make money. I mean, it’s borrowing money. It’s just a few percent a year. And these assets are better than that.”

The rescue plan should make distressed securities liquid (provide cash for securities) and eventually capital should be provided for some undercapitalized companies: “… there are two things needed in the system, the one that’s needed overwhelmingly is liquidity. I mean, when people are trying to sell, there has to be somebody there to buy. And they don’t have to buy at a fancy prices, but to buy. And then there’s also a capital problem with some of the institutions. We have provided capital here with a couple of institutions recently. The Federal government did that in the ‘30s for the RFC and I think there could well be a proper role for government in that. … But I don’t think trying to combine that with what’s going through now, I think what is needed now is liquidity.”

Unlike the Resolution Trust Company mechanism which resolved the Savings and Loan crisis by orderly liquidating their assets, in the present crisis there is an opportunity to buy distressed securities that may rise in value: “Yeah, well Resolution Trust Company was set up to liquidate a bunch of assets that the government had inherited because the savings and loans went broke. So the savings and loans went broke, the government stepped in, paid off depositors, and now they’re left with this mass of assets to sell. We’re not talking about selling here, we’re talking about buying intelligently. They were selling what they got handed to them by a bunch of savings and loan operators that had in many cases had done some very dumb thing. But their job was to liquidate it. And they liquidated. This is an entirely different proposition.”

The goal is to re-establish confidence: “Confidence in markets and in institutions, it’s a lot like oxygen. When you have it, you don’t even think about it. Indispensable. You can go years without thinking about it. When it’s gone for five minutes, it’s the only thing you think about.”

Derivatives have allowed for funny accounting and allowed otherwise sound companies to create tremendous risks for themselves: “AIG would be doing fine today. It was one of the ten largest companies in the United States in terms of market value, over 200 billion, the most respected insurer and everything in the world. If they never heard of the word derivatives, they’d be doing fine. They’d be going to work in the morning and they would have no troubles. But they — they — it was very easy to do, because it’s very tempting to write numbers on little pieces of paper and you can report the profit you want to, and there is no limit on it. I mean there is no capital requirements to it or anything of the sort. And basically, I said there were possibly financial weapons of mass destruction, and they had them. They destroyed AIG. They certainly contributed to the destruction of Bear Sterns and Lehman. Although Lehman had other problems, too.”

Leverage is very dangerous:
“You just pay for everything, you do smart things, you eventually get very rich. If you do smart things and use leverage and do one wrong thing along the way, it could wipe you out, because anything times zero is zero.”

Beware of geeks with clever computer models: “I mean they had all these types from Wall Street, you know, and they had advanced degrees, and they look very alert, and they came with these — they came with these things that said gamma and alpha and sigma and all that. And all I can say is beware of geeks, you know, bearing formulas.”

The American economy is still a marvel, and is going to recover: “I mean we had a seven for one improvement in the average American standard of living in the 20th century. Now, we had the great depression, we had two world wars, we had the flu epidemic. You know, we had oil shock. You know, we had all these terrible things happen. But something about the American system unleashed more of a potential to human beings over that hundred years so that we had a seven for one improvement in — there’s never been any — I mean, you have centuries where if you’ve got a 1 percent improvement, then it’s something. So we’ve got a great system. And we’ve got more productive capacity now than we ever have. The American worker is more productive than he’s ever been. We’ve got more people to do it. We’ve got all the ingredients for a sensational future. It’s just that right now the athlete’s on the floor. … This country is going to be living better ten years from now than it is now.”

Markets are fantastic, but prone to excesses: “… as long as you have markets, you’ll have excesses. … the human animal really doesn’t get a lot smarter. Now, you can you know you can have institutions that put curbs on that in various ways, and actually what the banks, you know, they have various capital ratios and that sort of thing, but the banks got around them, I mean, they set up SIVs [structured investment vehicles] and that sort of thing just to get more leverage.”

Accounting for securities should mark them to market:
“… I believe in mark to market. I think that accounting in 1974 Charlie, it was either 1974 or ’75, we owned a bunch of common stocks at Berkshire Hathaway. I told our shareholders what the market was. And we used that. I said I think these things are worth a lot more than market. And I think we’re going to make a lot of money out of it. But this is what they’re worth today. And I don’t think anybody gets hurt by telling the truth on that sort of thing. … once you start putting phony figures into financial statements, you get in a lot of trouble.”

The rise of the non American world is fine:
“I want our pie to grow all the people, but if some other guy’s pie is growing a little faster, that’s terrific. It will be good for us in the long run, and I mean there are, you know, six and a half billion people in this world. And it’s great for 300 million to keep enjoying more and more property, but I think it’s terrific if, you know, the remainder do. And I think if they can learn something from us in terms of our system, and I think they have, they are learning more about how to unleash the potential of their citizenry to turn out more goods and services that their citizens want or that we want, I think that’s terrific. And that’s — you know, I think it’s much better to live in the world where those around you, particularly when some of them have nuclear bombs, I think it’s much better to live in a world where their lives are getting better also.”

The fact that Americans consume more than they produce will slowly transfer ownership to foreigners, but it’s a slow problem: “As long as we consume more than we produce, and we trade away little pieces of the country daily, they’re going to own something. Now, they can’t run from American assets. I mean every day the rest of the world is going to have about two billion more of American assets than we have, as long as they sell us these goods. … But we’ve actually been pretty good on exports. I mean we are exporting 12% of our GDP now roughly. That was five percent many years ago, a much smaller GDP. So the rest of the world really likes our stuff pretty well. It’s just we buy so damn much of what they produce. … But our country’s productivity grows enough so we actually can do that, and we’ll still be better off.”

Greater inflation and unemployment is likely: “… we’re likely to have more inflation in the future as a consequence of the things we do to fight the present situation. … You’re going to see more people unemployed.”

Taxes shouldn’t treat income from capital more favorably than income from labor: “I think it’s terrible for people in effect to say that income from investment should be taxed at a much lower rate than income from labor. … everybody likes to talk about how the top one percent pays this percent in income, but the income tax, we’ll say 1.3 trillion. The payroll taxes are over 900 billion. That 900 billion, that doesn’t come from me. I pay it on the first hundred thousand or something like that. But that comes from the people in my office.”

The entire interview is worth watching or reading.

Update, 10/9/08: In September of 2005 I was asked by a friend whether we were in a real estate bubble.  It’s interesting to look back at my reply, “On buying land (aka, how to tell if we are in a real estate bubble)”, which I published on September 21, 2005.  I’m pleased that I foresaw the risks that the structure of the real estate industry was creating and that I saw the increasing risks home buyers were making.  On the other hand, I did not take sufficient time to look at the balance sheets of banks to see how decreasing real estate prices would hurt them.  I thought at the time the investment banks would not be dumb enough to hold the risk themselves.  Perhaps this is why Warren Buffett refers to the immense advantage that having had a longer experience in the market has given him over time.  I’ve since tried to bolster my own knowledge by reading extensively on prior panics and manias.  And always looking at the balance sheet.

Jon Stewart’s hilarious comparison of Bush’s speech on the current economic crisis and Bush’s speech in 2003 on the Iraq war:

Video: http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=186052&title=clusterf#@k-to-the-poor-house

The current economic crisis is far more proven, as Warren Buffett has opined, than the once apparent threat of weapons of mass destruction, but Stewart is hilarious none the less.

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In a CNBC interview Warren Buffett provided strong support for Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s plan to buy distressed securities from Wall Street firms:

BUFFETT: … If I didn’t think the government was going to act, I would not be doing anything this week. I might be trying to undo things this week. I am, to some extent [by putting $5 billion into Goldman Sachs], betting on the fact that the government will do the rational thing here and act promptly. It would be a mistake to be buying anything now if the government was going to walk away from the Paulson proposal.

BECKY: Why would that be a mistake? Because the institutions would collapse, or because you could get a better price [on Buffett's investment in Goldman Sachs]?

BUFFETT: Well, there’s just no telling what would happen. Last week we were at the brink of something that would have made anything that’s happened in financial history look pale. We were very, very close to a system that was totally dysfunctional and would have not only gummed up the financial markets, but gummed up the economy in a way that would take us years and years to repair. We’ve got enough problems to deal with anyway. I’m not saying the Paulson plan eliminates those problems. But it was absolutely, and is absolutely necessary, in my view, to really avoid going over the precipice.

CARL QUINTANILLA: Warren, we can almost hear you measuring your words as you speak, because what we’re talking about has such gravity. There are people out there who either don’t, or are unwilling, to acknowledge what exactly, how serious the situation was last week. And I’m hearing you say is that, was it the most frightening experience you’ve had in your lifetime, in terms of evaluating where this economy stands?

BUFFETT: Yeah, well, both the economy and the financial markets, but there’re so intertwined that what happens, they’re joined at the hip. And it doesn’t pay to get into horror stories in terms of naming institutions or anything. But I will tell you that the market could not have, in my view, could not have taken another week like what was developing last week. And setting forth the Paulson plan, it was the last thing, I think, that Hank Paulson wanted to do. there’s no Plan B for this.

BECKY: Warren, you mentioned that Wall Street could not have taken another week like that. But what does that mean to the American taxpayer who’s sitting at home saying, ‘Why is this my problem?’

BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it’s everybody’s problem. Unfortunately, the economy is a little like a bathtub. You can’t have cold water in the front and hot water in the back. And what was happening on Wall Street was going to immerse that bathtub very, very quickly in terms of business. Look, right now business is having trouble throughout the economy. But a collapse of the kind of institutions that were threatened last week, and their inability to fund, would have caused industry and retail and everything else to grind to something close to a halt. It was, and still is, a very, very dangerous situation. No plan is going to be perfect, but thanks heavens that Paulson had the imagination to step up with something that is of the scope that can really do something about it. And what he did with the money market funds, that was not an idea that I had, but as soon as I heard about it, that was an important stroke. Because the money, pulling out of the money market funds and going to Treasuries, and driving Treasury yields down to zero. That — a few more days of that and people would have been reading about lots and lots of troubles.

JOE KERNEN: People listen, Warren, when you speak. And I don’t know if you watched the hearings yesterday …

BUFFETT: I got to watch some of them.

JOE: But when the more dire it looked, in terms of communicating, with some of these Senators, the three-month or one-month bill, again, started acting similar to what was happening on Thursday. Now we averted that disaster on Thursday, but it’s already been three or four days. It’s almost as if these guys already forgot about the position that we were in. Do you think that accounted — we’re still susceptible to that happening again if it looked like they’re not going to go through with this?

BUFFETT: No, it would get worse. Last week will look like Nirvana (laughs) if they don’t do something. I think they will. I understand where they’re very mad about what’s happened in the past, but this isn’t the time to vent your spleen about that. This is the time to do something that gets this country back on the right track. What you have, Joe, you have all the major institutions in the world trying to deleverage. And we want them to deleverage, but they’re trying to deleverage at the same time. Well, if huge institutions are trying to deleverage, you need someone in the world that’s willing to leverage up. And there’s no one that can leverage up except the United States government. And what they’re talking about is leveraging up to the tune of 700 billion, to in effect, offset the deleveraging that’s going on through all the financial institutions. And I might add, if they do it right, and I think they will do it reasonably right, they won’t do it perfectly right, I think they’ll make a lot of money. Because if they don’t — they shouldn’t buy these debt instruments at what the institutions paid. They shouldn’t buy them at what they’re carrying, what the carrying value is, necessarily. They should buy them at the kind of prices that are available in the market. People who are buying these instruments in the market are expecting to make 15 to 20 percent on those instruments. If the government makes anything over its cost of borrowing, this deal will come out with a profit. And I would bet it will come out with a profit, actually.

BECKY: Are you buying instruments like these in the market?

BUFFETT: Well, I don’t want to leverage up. No one wants to leverage up in this thing. So, if I could buy a hundred billion of these kinds of instruments at today’s prices, and borrow non-recourse 90 billion, which I can’t, but if I could do that, I would do that with the expectation of significant profit.

JOE: But the government can do that. You can’t. And that’s why the private sector can’t, even you, can’t save the system.

BUFFETT: I can’t come close to it. But they have the ability to borrow. They can borrow much cheaper than I can borrow. They can borrow unlimited. They don’t have covenants. They don’t have — I mean, they are in the ideal position. So, for example, if I were hiring advisers, as I talked about doing to buy these things, I would tell those advisers, ‘Look it! People are buying these instruments to make 15 percent. So if you’re going to charge me any fees, I’m going to defer those fees until I get rid of these instruments later on. If I don’t make at least ten percent on my assets, you know, your fee goes down the drain. Because it should be a lead-pipe cinch to make 10 percent at the kind of prices that exist now. I wouldn’t try to write that into the legislation. I don’t think you should — I think they should punish, in many cases, the people — I would think they might insist on the directors of the institutions that participate in this program waiving all director’s fees for a couple of years. They should, maybe, eliminate bonues. They may wish to do some of those things. I don’t think you should try to write it into the instrument, though. I think that gets so damn complicated and ties people’s hands. But if I were administering the program, I think I’d be fairly tough about some of those things, and I’d make sure that the advisers earned me a return that was well above my cost of borrowing before they got paid a dime.

BECKY: Would you administer the program?

JOE: Yeah, can you be on the oversight board? (Buffett laughs.) Can you be on the oversight board?

BUFFETT: I’d love to administer (laughs). I’d love to administer it for nothing, but I would really love to administer and get some kind of an override in terms of the profits, which is naturally the way Wall Street thinks. No, it’s not my game to do that, but I will tell you that the buyers of the instruments these days are going to do better than the sellers. And the big buyer, if they — they shouldn’t pay any attention to the cost of these instruments to the selling institutions. They shouldn’t pay any attention to the carrying value. In fact, one thing you might do, is if someone wants to sell a hundred billion of these instruments to the Treasury, let them sell two or three billion in the market and then have the Treasury match that, for what they pay. You don’t want the Treasury to be a patsy. But I’ll tell you, with Hank Paulson on top of it, you couldn’t have any better guy to do that. The important thing is that if this program extends into the next administration is to have somebody in the next administration that has similar market savvy.

BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it goes beyond credit default swaps into all forms of derivatives. But the derivative genie got out of the bottle, and it’s a huge genie, and it will never get back into the bottle. It is a terribly tough problem because they are not homogeneous items. It’s one thing to have a clearing house for the futures in Chicago, or something, and every morning have everybody post to market and that’s a very efficient system. It’s very hard to do that with derivatives where you can derivatives based on the New Zealand money supply or the number of babies born in Japan, and all kinds of things as the variables. And they’re often very complicated. I applaud Dinallo. He is an outstanding insurance comimssioner. But getting regulation around the entire derivatives market is really tough. I’ve thought a lot about it. But it’s important. Derivatives have been an important part of the problem in financial markets. And they continue to be part of it. And in AIG’s case — AIG would be doing fine now, I think, if they’d never heard of the word derivative.

CARL: When do you think, Warren — I don’t know if you even have an answer to this question — When is the absolute deadline by which you think this needs to happen? Is it this weekend? Can you be that specific? Or if this thing were to bleed into next week, or if they had to reconvene a special session, would that be disastrous?

BUFFETT: Well, I think anything that makes it look like it’s in doubt is what causes the problem. So if they said on Friday we’re absolutely having a vote on Monday, or something of the sort, I don’t think that would be a problem. But if they went home on Friday and there was doubt about whether they were going to do something on Monday, I think you’d see some things you don’t want to see in the markets and they would have some effects on the economy.

JOE: You were watching yesterday, and I don’t know, maybe I don’t know the ways of Washington. Maybe they say one thing and maybe they’re really planning — you know, they have to look good for their constituents. But I wasn’t convinced they really understood the seriousness of the situation, Warren, and that was after they said, look, Greenspan says we need this, Volcker says we need this, Bernanke, Paulson. Now we have you. I don’t know. Do you think they get it?

BUFFETT: Well, I think they will get it. I think enough of them will get it. You know, it’s not like Pearl Harbor where you could look at what happened with your own eyes and decide you had to do something that day. But this is sort of an economic Pearl Harbor we’re going through. And I think most of them will get it. And I do believe they will do what’s right for the country. They may vent their spleen a little bit by getting mad about the people that brought us into that, and I don’t blame them for that. I might do that privately, too. But in the end, you know, Republican, Democrat, I think they’ve got the interest of the country at heart and I think they will do the right thing. But I hope they do it soon. (Laughs.)

BECKY: You know, you mentioned earlier, in the grand scheme of things, it’s going to matter who the next Treasury Secretary is going to be. Are there names of people you think would be sound in either administration.

BUFFETT: Becky, if I were running things, Republican or Democrat, I would ask Hank to stay on. I mean, you don’t get talent like that very often in any administrative job. And the guy pays an enormous price to do it. He’s probably sleeping three or four hours a night. He knows the market. He’s got the interests of the country at heart. So I think if I were either Barack Obama or John McCain and found myself in the White House in January, I would go down there and say, ‘Hank, do me a favor, stick around another year.’

BUFFETT: They can make money on this deal. I can tell you this. I would love to have 700-billion at Treasury rates to be able to buy fixed-income securities now that they’re in distress. There’s a lot of money to be made.

JOE: It’s just that, you know, they want these details, Warren. They said — Paulson says there’s the hold-to-maturity price and there’s the firesale price. We’re going to go somewhere in between, get a much better price but still leave enough for the people that are buying it to make some money. That can be done in principle? There’s a way to do that, do you think?

BUFFETT: I think what I would be looking for — I heard that hold-to-maturity price. I’m not as excited about that. I basically like a market, or something very close to a market-related price. And there are ways to determine that and I don’t think that Uncle Sam should be in the business of paying somebody a whole lot more than it’s worth in the market today. And if the guy that bought it doesn’t like it, he doesn’t have to sell it, and it was his problem, he bought it in the first place. I think a market price will enable people to be leveraged. The problem they have now is that some of the institutions, they’re loaded with this stuff, they’re having trouble funding, and they’re worried about being able to sell a ton of it. But take the Merrill Lynch deal. Merrill Lynch had to take back 75 percent of the sales price. Well, they didn’t want to take back that 75 percent. I would let ‘em sell it for the same price, but I’d pay them the whole thing in cash. So they’d be a lot better off if they could have sold the whole thing at that same price but gotten paid a hundred percent in cash instead of having to take back 75 percent. And I see the government fulfilling that kind of a function.

JOE: All the outrage we’re seeing in these comments from viewers, and obviously the senators are hearing from constituents. If we take your word for it, that the government could even break-even, or only lose 50 billion, that 700 billion dollar number is out there in the public, and people think that we’re spending that.

BUFFETT: Yeah, they think that, yeah.

JOE: It seems crucially important to get the point across that, in your view, we could, the government could actually end up making money and saving the taxpayer from much worse, a much worse outcome if we didn’t do this.

BUFFETT: The government is getting 700 billion worth of assets, assuming they spend the 700 billion, they’re getting 700 billion of assets at what I regard as attractive prices. And they’ve got the staying power to hold those things. If I could get 700 billion, if I could borrow 700 billion on the government’s terms and buy these assets I’d be doing it myself. But unfortunately I’m tapped out. (Laughs.)

BECKY: And yet, Warren, Mayor Mike Bloomberg, I heard him making comments this morning, and he’s someone I know you’ve spoken very highly of ..

BUFFETT: I admire him.

BECKY: You admire him. he says this morning we should not be giving a blank check to have something passed in the dead of night. How dire is this situation?

BUFFETT: Well, I’m sure we didn’t want to go to war on December 7, 1941, maybe, in the dead of night, or whenever we did it, in the middle of the afternoon actually. But there are time when events force timetables on you, and force action, and you have to be — You know, it’s just like in my business. I might like to think over buying something for a month, I’m not that type anyway. But in the end, if somebody offers me something that makes sense, I better decide whether to act or not. And if it makes sense to me, I usually don’t attach unnecessary conditions, you know. It would be nice to have the luxury of thinking about this for three months. But I will tell you, if you think about this for three months, you’re going to have a situation where — If you think about it for three weeks, you’re going to be facing a situation that’s far different, and far more difficult, than if you do something now.

(Link to the transcripts: http://www.cnbc.com/id/26867866)

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